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Abstract. In a decade when all activities are globalized, including 
insurance, the recent focus of the supervisory authorities became the 
leveling of the legal framework  concerning the solvency requirements of 
the companies acting on the market (as a consequence of the 2008 crisis, 
much more acute in USA than in Europe, where Basel Agreement 
decreased the fall of the banking sector). The present paper analyses the 
way in which the main solvency regimes applied at international level 
influence the equity of the insurance companies, especially the increase 
in the solvency capital required by the supervisors, taking into 
consideration the risk profile of the company. Moreover, the paper 
provides a blueprint of the methods to ensure the financial stability of the 
national industry, in order to respond adequately to systemic and 
systematic risks. 
 
Keywords:  solvency; Solvency II; solvency capital; prudential 
supervision; QIS. 
 
JEL Codes: G22, G15. 
REL Code: 11C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical and Applied Economics 
Volume XX (2013), No. 2(579), pp. 113-128 Laura Elly Naghi 
	
114 
The first function of an insurance company is to manage these risks in a 
manner such that it would allow at any moment of its activity to honor its 
contractual obligations towards the final consumers (insureds and 
beneficiaries), in other words – its solvency degree. Due to the dimensions, 
structure and complexity degree of the insurance industry, the compliance 
process of an insurance company by their clients in a direct way is difficult to 
be performed. This is the determinant factor that causes the action of the 
supervisory authorities around the world to implement legal frameworks that 
state the risk management procedures at the level of insurance entities as a 
support in the final objective of protecting the interest of the insureds. Such an 
approach of the risk management process necessary for the events present in the 
insurance industry makes possible the guarantee a high financial health of the 
market and thus an improvement of the public trust (a vital element in the 
development of the market). 
The intensive process of modification of the legal framework that took 
place in the period of 2003-2012 represents a normal attitude of the supervisor, 
while the external environment of the insurance was changed and abridged 
repeatedly, based on a series of systemic and systematic events registered 
during this period. The massive losses of the insurance market from 2001, as a 
result of terrorism risk, followed by equally important losses in 2005, 2009, 
2010 and 2011 as a result of natural catastrophes risks brought about the 
interest of the supervisory authorities to identify protection forms of the 
national markets against important liquidity outflows  paid by the insurance and 
reinsurance companies, on the one hand, and against the bankruptcy possibility 
among the market players with serious consequences from a reputational point 
of view, on the other hand. 
Beside these changes that have led to increased development and 
implementation of an effective management process also at the level of the 
entities which have accepted risks on behalf of their clients, a new systemic risk 
was added – the financial crisis of 2008 – which by its specificity, ie affecting 
the banking sector and real estate and capital markets, could have caused a 
general collapse if certain preventive measures had not been implemented by 
the insurance regulators. In the context of the existence of minimum capital 
requirements to ensure solvency of insurance companies, shocks of 2008 have 
not had the same impact suffered by financial institutions other than insurance. 
However, loss of real estate and capital markets led to a reduction in the value 
of investments of insurance companies. This was in fact what prompted major 
unrest of the insurance market regulators to impose additional capital 
requirements under the new solvency regime to continue to cover all exposures 
in the event of catastrophic event. Influence of the prudential supervision over the capitalization of the Romanian insurance market 
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The 2008 crisis led to a transfer of focus of the authorities monitoring 
those events with high impact, catastrophic even, with a reduced probability of 
novelty at the risk management level until that moment – when such exposures 
were considered last on the priority list of entities. This is the reason why it was 
raised the question urgent to quantify all risks faced by insurance companies 
(issue quite difficult to achieve due to lack of historical information) and their 
modeling, taking into account the correlations between risks. From the point of 
view of regulators, this approach provides a clearer picture of the risk profile 
that an insurer can take. 
The chain of economic crisis from 2008 brought about a new challenge 
for financial markets, strongly shaken by the bankruptcies banks and reducing 
liquidity. One of the consequences was an intensification of the supervision 
process (Swiss Re, 2011) from the regulatory authorities – considered negligent 
in preventing the shock created by the financial crisis. In this regard, the 
authorities have focused on concentrating the monitoring process, on imposing 
rules and basic parameters of the global financial and economic systems. In 
many ways, understanding and acceptance of the overall system of risks, 
implicitly the systemic risks, are new. For the first time since 2008 we have 
seen how strong and related the international financial markets are. A bank that 
operated in a market in Europe (actually a relatively small banking institution – 
Bank of Northen Rock, United Kingdom) caused an infection of the entire 
financial system and prompted an intensification of concerns (with significant 
effects on the investors’ confidence in the market) worldwide, during this 
period, the issue of full collapse of national and not just components of these 
systems was taken into consideration. 
Despite the crisis induced in the banking sector, insurers and reinsurers 
found themselves in the process of attacks from the regulators who deliberately 
delivered a brutal cutting of exposures related to the banking system (Liedtke, 
2010) – there were companies like AIG that, beyond the investments banking 
division, failed on the insurance market because of their investment products 
(Dinallo, 2010). No other bankruptcy or crisis signal was recorded in the 
insurance industry – companies continued to pay their contractual obligations 
towards clients. However, in the whirl of events, the surveillance system was 
alarmed and the result was a dramatic and disproportionate increase in 
insurance and reinsurance markets. Moreover, due to the banking crisis, interest 
rates decreased, thus affecting the investments of insurers (a decrease of 1% in 
interest rates lead to a cost of 220 billion euros a year (Swiss Re, 2011). A 
major difference between banking system and insurance industry is that a 
company's bankruptcy (caused by liquidity problems) will not create liquidity 
problems to other market players – on the contrary, the other insurance 
companies will take over the portfolio of extinct company, thus protecting the Laura Elly Naghi 
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final client. Moreover, a failure of an insurance company would not create the 
risk that taxpayers come to pay from their own pockets the resulted losses for 
fear of disappearance of the entire insurance system, as was the case with the 
banks that had severe liquidity issues. 
One result of the crisis is the acceleration, unjustified in the opinion of 
experts (Brahin, 2011), of the process of imposing prudential legal framework 
created by the supervisory authorities. Given that these frameworks pass 
through national calibration exercises with an implementation schedule already 
established and sometimes slightly outdated, an acceleration of the legislative 
process, under political pressure, would not only bring new exposures to the 
insurance industry, under the form of model risk. 
The solvency of insurance companies may be defined as the ability of the 
insurer to honor the commitments made. Given its importance, supervisory 
authorities and scoring agencies have developed and implemented systems for 
solvency assessment. The starting point in developing regulatory frameworks of 
solvency of insurance companies was represented by the set of rules regarding 
the solvency in the banking sector (Basel 2 Agreement) and the long-awaited 
reform of international accounting standards (International Accounting 
Standards – IAS). 
 
Models of solvency assessment 
 
Existence of several measurement systems of solvency is explained by the 
desirability of explicit measurement in a manner more or less sophisticated, of 
each risk. Solvency is being monitored thus at different stages of the business 
cycle – the first step being represented by the new companies authorization 
procedure, ie the imposition of adequate capital. An ex-post monitoring of 
solvency is performed throughout the company's activity until all contractual 
obligations are honored, even if it means throughout liquidation proceedings of 
the company. 
Throughout the activity of a company, in some countries it is considered 
the duty of the regulatory authority to carry out prior verifications concerning 
the legislative compliance, quality of products offered on the market and the 
appropriateness of the prices of these products (OECD, 2010). Only a number 
of countries like Hungary, Korea and the US are concerned with the a priori 
approach of the monitoring of companies solvency. In Switzerland price control 
is performed a priori for a number of special risks, but the trend in recent years 
has been to give up this practice. Following the adoption of the third generation 
of insurance directives, all EU Member States have implemented ex-post 
monitoring (Leflaive, 2001), and Japan has introduced a monitoring system of 
risk-based solvency. The purpose of this decision was to encourage insurance Influence of the prudential supervision over the capitalization of the Romanian insurance market 
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companies to offer new products without forgetting to meet future regulatory 
requirements in force, yet without jeopardizing the financial position of the 
company. From this point of view, Belgium maintains a high degree of 
vigilance, meaning that each product is subject to ex-post profitability, 
verification based on which the regulatory authority may decide to increase the 
premium or another measure to restore the financial balance of the product. 
Retrospective method is applied in all OECD countries in several forms, 
of which the most important are the fixed ratio model and the risk based model, 
which is called "risk-based capital model" (Risk Based Capital) The two models 
are different in terms of the number of factors taken into consideration and the 
complexity of formulas used. In fixed ratio model, solvency requirements are 
set as a percentage of the value of a variable data which is considered to be 
strongly correlated with degree of exposure of company. This variable assumes 
a simple function of one or more elements of the balance sheet or profit and 
loss account. Such models are used in Australia, Korea, Mexico and Turkey. 
The main advantage of this model is the simplicity of implementation However, 
due to their simplicity, it is very difficult to adapt to a particular risk profile 
and, moreover, they are highly sensitive to the variable used as the basis for the 
ratio. Limitations of the model can be reduced by using and comparing several 
different ratios. 
Prospective method refers to theoretical models that calculate solvency 
indicators using historical data and assumptions about changes occurring in the 
company profile (renewal ratio, indirect costs, etc.) or on the market 
(investment returns, volatility of losses). The method is used in Australia to test 
the adequacy of capital for life insurance. 
The RBC model (Risk Based Capital – RBC) is the instrument of solvency 
evaluation and capital requirements to conduct insurance business under 
conditions of minimum risk. In this method, the minimum capital required 
(demanded) is calculated from the risks which are faced by insurance 
companies. The RBC model was developed by NAIC (National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners) in the early 90s and entered into force in two distinct 
years taking into account the insurance products sold by insurance companie; in 
the 1993 for life insurance and in 1994 for other types of insurance (non-life 
insurance). This model was the first instrument applied unitary at the federal 
level; until its introduction, each federal state had its own rules concerning the 
insurers' solvency. 
This new prudential system, developed by NAIC to reflect in a way more 
close to reality the risk degree of exposure of companies (Geneva Association, 
2010), was accompanied by a number of other regulations, particularly in 
accounting – namely the financial reports. Similarly to other models, the 
principle underlying the RBC model is to establish a minimum capital Laura Elly Naghi 
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necessary for each of the major risks which are identified by the insurance 
companies. The calculation method is extremely complex and takes into 
account the characteristics of each company. Finally, it is calculated the total 
minimum required capital by combining minimum capital required for each risk 
separately. This is then compared with the actual amount of capital in the 
company. The value of the ratio between the company's capital and minimum 
capital required is the one that can determine the response of the regulator. 
 
The Canadian model for the assessment of minimum required capital of 
an insurance company is a risk-based model, similar to the American model, 
using the same structure of risk sharing. The difference lies in the practical 
calculation – on the one hand, there is a difference in the assignment of risks 
into risk classes, on the other hand, the final formula is a simple addition of 
factors. The Minimum Capital Test – MCT is a test that compares the share 
capital held required share capital, resulting in a MCT ratio that must be at least 
100% (preferably 150%). The regulator will alert the insurance company/will 
step in when the MCT ratio will breach thresholds. 
 
The Swiss Solvency Test was developed in 2003 as a tool to protect the 
interests of holders of insurance policies. The stated objective of the SST test 
was to define the principles for determining the solvency requirements. With 
the introduction of the new law on the supervision of insurance at the beginning 
of 2006, the SST model became mandatory for large non-life insurance 
companies and for life insurance companies. Since 2008 (the Geneva 
Association, 2010), the SST model has become mandatory for all insurance 
companies. Obligation to comply with solvency capital requirements according 
to the SST came into force starting with 2011. To determine the insurer's 
solvency, the risk-bearing capital is compared with the target capital. The 
model includes a set of principles, of which the most relevant are: 
  Assets and liabilities are valued at market price; 
  Capital adequacy is the difference between its target capital and risk-
bearing capital; 
  The target of SST model is represented by legal entities and 
groups/conglomerates domiciled in Switzerland; 
  All relevant probability states should be modeled probabilistically; 
  Scenarios defined by the regulatory authority as well as the company 
must be evaluated and, if relevant, aggregated in the target capital 
calculation; 
  Total or partial internal models can also be used. If SST standard 
model is not applicable, then a partial or full internal model should be 
used; Influence of the prudential supervision over the capitalization of the Romanian insurance market 
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  The internal model must be integrated into the company's core 
processes; 
  SST report towards the supervisory authority must be understood also 
by third parties. 
A final example of prudential framework is the third generation of 
solvency assessment systems, developed and implemented by large insurance 
companies. The main difference between this generation of systems and the 
first two assessments is the explicit nature of the evaluation. If in the first two 
generations, the assessment was static – it used deterministic models – in the 
third generation, the evaluation is done using stochastic models and can thus 
customize their data model taking into account the individual data of the 
insurance companies. These models, called "internal models", although they 
have not reached an acceptable level of homogeneity, they are the latest trend in 
the field, based on the due benefits (model custom business needs, leading to a 
custom adequate capital) and are supported at the level of supervisory 
authorities. 
The objective of Solvency II regime is to provide the end customers with 
the fact that insurance companies have sufficient financial strength to cover 
exposures transferred through insurance policies and to ensure the financial 
system stability. Also, the Solvency II regime had view to establish a set of 
solvency requirements that reflect the existing risks when adopting the 
Directive and which are faced by insurance companies. Calculating solvency 
requirements should not block unjustifiably the activity of the insurance 
company; everyone is trying to establish certain principles, not imposing 
excessive regulations. 
Before the adoption of Solvency II, the regulatory framework for the 
insurance industry has remained almost unchanged for a period of 30 years, 
which led to a discrepancy between the reality of the insurance industry and the 
regulatory framework. The economic and technical transformations contributed 
to the placing of a reform of the legal system. Given the intense competition 
and a national internationalization of business, the lack of uniform framework 
legislation that would protect the interests of final policyholders, regardless of 
their country of domicile, all resulted in the neglect the insured-insurer 
relationship, in complaints from customers, in liquidity problems of the 
insurance companies. Moreover, the increased competition on the insurance 
market tends to diminish the profits of the insurance companies, which 
therefore inquire more closely the level of required capital (Liedtke, 2009), 
under pressure from shareholders, who want a certain return on their 
investments. 
The development of financial instruments has significantly changed the 
insurance industry: the range of insurance products available on the market has Laura Elly Naghi 
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been extended with complex and interesting shapes; the methods of alternative 
risk transfer were commonly used. Moreover, the intensification of occurrence 
of new risks or increase in their severity (including catastrophic risks) are 
factors that have changed the default statistics and hence the financial stability 
of insurance companies. Finally, the development of computers, mathematical 
models and computer applications allow spread of stochastic models, to the 
detriment of deterministic models. 
All these elements of economic, financial and technical nature 
cumulatively generated a real improvement in solvency assessment system of 
the insurance companies, allowing comparisons between different companies 
from varying markets and creating a unified supervision system. 
 
Assets 
Surplus 
Assets 
Surplus 
Solvency margin 
SCR 
MCR 
Current technical 
provisions 
Risk 
margin 
Other passive 
elements 
Real technical 
provisions 
Other passive 
elements 
SOLVENCY I  SOLVENCY II 
 
Figure 1. Differencies between Solvency I and Solvency II 
 
According to the new solvency system, there are taken into account 
tougher solvency requirements of insurers to ensure that they have sufficient 
capital, especially in light of the financial crisis in recent years. The 
methodology for calculating the solvency includes besides liability risks and 
risks related to the company's assets; in this respect, insurers must constitute 
provisions (Care, Fenech, 2010) to cover market risk (decrease in the value of 
investment portfolios), credit risk (insolvency of customers and partners) and 
operational risks, which will help to improve the financial position of the 
insurance companies. 
Another novelty brought by the Solvency II regime refers to the type of 
model used – through Solvency I regime, the approach was retrospective, that is 
only based on the analysis of historical data, while Solvency II introduces a 
risk-based approach, that will consider the historical data but will take into 
account also factors that may occur in the future, such as natural disasters or 
development of new insurance products. 
Beyond the restrictions brought by the complexity of the calculation 
methodology and the difficulty of quantifying risk factors considered, Solvency II 
regime has certain benefits, both for policyholders and for insurers. Beyond Influence of the prudential supervision over the capitalization of the Romanian insurance market 
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primary benefit, namely to protect the insurance company against such 
catastrophic exposures, there are other benefits derived from the 
implementation of the new regime, which are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Benefits brought by Solvency II 
Insurer  Insured
Reduced losses suffered by the insured  Reduced bankrupcy risk of the insurer  
Allows using the models of capital evaluation and risks 
evaluation  
Reduced insurance cost
Reduced costs and increased flexibility  Larger range of products
Increased trust in the financial stability of the insurer Better correlation between offered products and 
individual needs 
Strict supervision permits prompt adaptation of the 
capital to the minimum requirements 
 
Solvency capital requirement 
The solvency capital is calculated based on the going concern assumption 
of the insurance company, calibrated so that it pursues all quantifiable risks to 
which it is exposed in a certain period of time. Calibration covers existing 
activities, better said unexpected losses, and any new business expected to be 
written in the following 12 months. The solvency capital requirement 
corresponds to the value at risk of basic own funds of an insurance or 
reinsurance companies, with a confidence level of 99.5% for a period of one 
year. The solvency capital requirement shall cover at least the following risks 
(Swiss Re, 2006): the underwriting risk; life underwriting risk; underwriting 
health risk; market risk; credit risk; operational risk. Solvency capital can be 
calculated by the standard model or by an internal model. 
 
Minimum capital requirement 
The Minimum Capital Requirement corresponds to a value of the eligible 
basic own funds below which policyholders and beneficiaries are exposed to an 
unacceptable level of risk if the activity of the insurance and reinsurance 
companies are allowed to continue their work. The methodology for calculating 
the minimum capital requirement is very clear and simple – condition imposed 
in order to submit the audit process. Thus, this indicator is calculated as a linear 
function of a set or a subset of the following variables: technical provisions, 
written premiums, capital-at-risk, deferred tax and administrative expenses. The 
resulting function is calibrated proportionaly with the value at risk of the own 
funds of the company taking into account a confidence level of 85% for a 
period of one year. The resulting value of the minimum capital requirement 
must not fall below 25% nor exceed 45% of the solvency capital requirement of 
the company. Laura Elly Naghi 
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Investment rules 
Regarding the portfolio of assets, the insurance companies have a 
recommendation to invest only in those assets (financial instruments) whose 
risks are easily identified, assessed, quantified and managed. Assets held to 
cover value of technical provisions are invested given the nature and duration of 
the contractual obligations of the company in assets so that the interests of final 
customers are not dented in any way based on their contractual terms 
communicated to them. Desirable is that the assets in the portfolio are properly 
diversified so as to avoid excessive reliance on any particular asset type, issuer 
or group or geographical area as well as excessive accumulation of risk across 
the portfolio. 
 
Comparative analysis of the prudential regimes  
 
The Solvency II regime suggests a standard model for calculating the 
solvency that falls in the category of systems based on several risks 
quantification. Like the SST regime, Solvency II regime offers the possibility 
and even support their own internal models, subject to approval by the 
regulatory authority, which should be within the typology of the models which 
quantify in great detail all risks and their interdependencies. 
The European and the Swiss prudential systems share the same 
foundation, based on working principles. Both models provide risk-based 
capital requirements, taking into account the market value of balance sheet 
items. Furthermore, both models support a stronger internal risk culture and 
allow regulators to respond in a flexible manner at changes in circumstances. 
Finally, both Solvency II model and SST model introduce the concept of group 
supervision by a dedicated group supervisor (CRO Forum, 2009) – the 
Solvency II model will explain in detail how the cooperation between 
supervisors will work. 
Concerning the Solvency II model and Basel II model, the numbering can 
be misleading, implying similar developments. Solvency II is a comprehensive 
framework which already had included ways to address critical issues that 
became apparent after the last financial crisis (EC, 2009) while Basel II model 
has not yet investigated this direction. 
The Swiss Solvency Test (SST) is the first circulating regulatory regime 
that sets an economic model for the assessment of risk-based capital and is the 
precursor to the European Solvency II regime. The supervisory activity in 
Switzerland is an illustration of the regulatory regimes of the new generation 
(Dacorogna, Keller, 2009), based on principles and consultancy, with a strong 
perspective on solvency and other quality aspects of groups. US regulatory 
system relies on a combination of approaches based on rules and principles. Influence of the prudential supervision over the capitalization of the Romanian insurance market 
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The valuation of assets and liabilities of a company is made according to rules 
and principles. Under RBC's component based on tangible rules, the methods of 
calculating the solvency requirements are clearly defined, insurers are required 
to hold sufficient capital to cover at least the RBC requirements. Calculation of 
these requirements quantify in great detail all asset risks – derived from the 
volatility of shares, bonds, real estates – credit risk, underwriting risk arising 
from subsidiaries. NAIC latest trend is to include also the evaluation of the 
group's solvency as well as group supervision, taking into account the success 
of the SST regime. 
Beyond the similarities between them, the prudential regimes of 
assessment of solvency have a number of differences concerning the response 
to significant risk exposures. 
Thus, most regimes prohibit the insurance companies to engage in the 
management of speculative derivatives. As a general rule, within a group, only 
banks or brokers or other entities (excluding insurance company) are entitled to 
use derivative hedge. Under Solvency II model, credit institutions, investment 
firms and financial institutions are included in the computation of solvency of 
the group which includes an insurance company. Speculative derivative related 
activities concerning a component of the group, whether or not regulated, are 
included in the group's capital requirements. Moreover, the regulatory authority 
has the right intervene through discretionary capital requirements, if a risk does 
not present sufficient coverage through the existing solvency capital. 
In the case of the SST model, the calculation of group capital includes 
balance sheet items of insurance and non-insurance. The SST calculation will 
consider the derivative activity of non-insurance balance sheet items either as a 
group, in the calculation of consolidated amount, or at enterprise level, within 
the group. Moreover, this activity is required to be presented separately in the 
report to the regulatory authority. Concerning the US RBC model, it does not 
include in its area of monitoring the activities related to derivatives held by a 
non-insurance entity within the group. While banking entities that include 
insurance divisions are subject to the supervisory of banking system (hence the 
AIG situation that escalated as a result of not being monitored by NAIC, but by 
the banking authority that failed to prevent the exposure of the financial 
institution). 
Another aspect that illustrates differences between supervision 
arrangements relate to the mismanagement of short-term funding sources which 
generate the liquidity risk exposure. Solvency II regime is theoretically a capital 
regulatory framework. It does not include specific quantitative requirements for 
liquidity risk (CRO Forum, 2009), regardless of the activity that generates it. In 
order to address the liquidity risk, the available capital is less relevant than the 
liquidity degree of the capital available – companies must implement a Laura Elly Naghi 
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management process of liquidity risk. Consequently, EU regulations focus on 
the governance and reporting to the supervisory authority about the coverage of 
liquidity risk. If the insurer does not ensure implementation of liquidity risk 
management, the regulator has several options, including imposing additional 
capital requirement. Lately, a need is becoming more distinct, refering to the 
introduction of contingency plans (CEIOPS, 2009) on liquidity risk – plans that 
are  to be reported at regular intervals by the board of directors of the insurance 
company/group. The situation in Switzerland is similar to that of the EU. There 
are not provided any formal requirementson liquidity risk management or 
reporting. Similar to Solvency II regime, the SST model seeks capital rather 
than focusing on liquidity risk through quantitative requirements. However, the 
regulatory authority of Switzerland laid the groundwork for developing 
qualitative indicators in this direction, taking into account the principle that all 
insurance companies must develop adequate systems of risk management and 
internal control and must report any change in risk profile. In the US, states 
supervision authorities focus on proper analysis of assets, with a review of 
liquidity risk management practices by regulated examinations, questionnaires 
and surveys, as well as models of stress on liquidity (NAIC, 2009). Lending 
activities of the assets held by insurance companies are explicitly required to be 
analyzed, in order to reflect the risk inherent in the asset-liability management. 
Another difference of the regimes relates to the way of valuation of assets 
and liabilities taken into account when calculating solvency. According to the 
RBC model, balance sheet items are measured under accounting rules, taking 
into account historical cost. On the other hand, the Solvency II proposes the 
valuation of assets and liabilities based on market conditions to reflect in a way 
more real their value although the capital assessment methodology in this case 
is more difficult. 
Derived from the control structure based on a single pillar concerning the 
quantitative requirements, the RBC model does not allow the insurance 
companies to develop their own internal models for solvency, that meet the 
needs of each insurer (Joint Forum, 2010). The Solvency II model accepts and 
even encourages insurance companies to develop custom internal models based 
on the specific risk profile of the insurance business, subject to approval by the 
regulatory authority. 
 
Impact of the prudential European regime on the insurance industry 
 
The Solvency II regime will apply to all EU companies, starting with 
calendar year 2013, but not to small insurance companies with subscription 
below 5 million EUR per year. The implementation of Solvency II in Europe 
affects insurance companies and the activity of the national supervisory Influence of the prudential supervision over the capitalization of the Romanian insurance market 
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authority, the Insurance Supervisory Commission. Thus, in 2012, the Insurance 
Supervisory Commission said that the strategy (CSA, 2010) adopted for the 
following period is to change the supervision philosophy by replacing the 
supervision of "compliance" with the one based on risk assessment – a 
necessary step for the implementation of the Solvency requirements. 
The Solvency II regime will have implications on the market supply. 
Given that insurance companies must provide, under the Directive, an adequate 
level of capital based on the assumed risk profile, it is possible that certain risks 
to be excluded from the list of exposures incurred in order to comply with the 
capital requirement. The visible result will be the elimination of insurance 
products offering protection for risks excluded from the company's risk profile 
(Guy Carpenter, 2011). This is particularly the case for medium-sized 
companies that will convert their insurance products in order to have lower 
capital requirements when they will implement the Solvency II regime. 
Another effect of the Solvency II regime is the change in the structure of 
the insurance market – the process started in Romania ever since 2004 (through 
additional capital requirements) will continue to produce mergers at the level of 
the market so that actors can comply with the enhanced solvency capital 
requirement – at the European level, 360 insurance companies in the 2,520 
(14.28%) (Thompson, 2011) participating in last calibration study of the 
Solvency II regime declared their intention to consolidate in order to meet the 
demands of the new regime. 
The new supervisory regime proposed by Solvency II directive is consi-
dered more sensitive to the risks which are faced by insurance companies due to 
additional capital requirements that they must comply with and which depend 
on the risk profile assumed. Concerning these conditions, there are expected 
higher levels of solvency capital, taking into account that the risks are much 
higher. The two capital requirements imposed by the Solvency II regime are: 
  Minimum Capital Requirements (MCR); 
  Solvency Capital Requirements (SCR). 
The Supervisory Commission's intervention is required provided that the 
equity of an insurance company are below the minimum capital requirement. In 
this case, the regulatory authority has the right to withdraw the authorization of 
the company. If funds are lower than the Solvency Capital Requirement, then 
the regulator will monitor the situation pending the implementation of 
corrective measures to assist until the recovery of the company. 
In the form of preparation phases of the insurance industry through 
identifying the impact of the new Solvency II regime on the value of insurance 
companies would be possible, the European Commission has nominated the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
(CEIOPS) as responsible for carrying out exercises of calibration for the Laura Elly Naghi 
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standard model. The purpose of these quantitative impact studies (Quantitative 
Impact Study – QIS) started ever since 2005 and to which insurers are invited to 
participate on a voluntary basis is to simulate the calculation of solvency capital 
in the light of Solvency II standard model. 
In the last QIS5 calibration study applied in Romania total value of the 
balance sheet assets decreased by 9.77% compared with the value calculated 
according to current accounting standards, as a result of items not recognized 
by the Solvency II regime, namely postponed procurement costs. Concerning 
the liabilities side, the value of technical provisions decreased by 29.32% 
(compared with calculations on the basis of the current set of principles of 
evaluation), particularly for life insurance, and thus an increase in equity was 
registered (hence the capital surplus existing at the level of the market). 
According to the QIS 4 study, there was no significant change in report of 
structure and aggregate value – the reduction was 3.7% on the basis of Solvency II 
compared to asset value calculated in accordance with the principles of Solvency 
I. On the liability side of the balance sheet, after applying Solvency II 
methodology, the reduction of technical provisions was noted particularly for life 
insurance by 50.8% due to negative values of best estimates for policies without 
the clause of participating in the profit. Concerning the general insurance 
business, the reduction of technical provisions was insignificant -only 3.6%. 
Regardless of the percentage of reduction, the modification of the technical 
provisions resulted in an increase of own funds by 57% compared to equity 
available by the application current assessment standards. 
 
Impact on the solvency capital requirements (SCR) 
In the last QIS exercise, comparing the excess capital under Solvency II 
(the difference between own funds and SCR) with the excess capital under 
Solvency I (calculated as the difference between the available solvency margin 
and the minimum solvency margin), it was observed a decrease of it due to the 
increase in capital requirements imposed by the new regime. On the other hand, 
there has been an increase in solvency capital requirements, especially for the 
general insurance business. From this point of view, out of the 18 Romanian 
companies participating in the study, three did not meet the solvency capital 
requirements (ie own funds were worth less than the SCR) and would be 
monitored in order to correct their risk profile. From the point of view of 
solvency degree calculated according to QIS5 (as ratio between own funds and 
SCR) it decreased by one third compared to QIS4 exercise, reaching 1.64, 
compared with 3.31 calculated according to Directive Solvency I. In QIS4 
exercise, the solvency capital requirements (SCR) resulted under Solvency II 
increased by 112% compared to the Solvency I requirements (based on 
minimum solvency margin). Influence of the prudential supervision over the capitalization of the Romanian insurance market 
	
127
	
127
Impact on the minimum capital requirements (MCR) 
A positive aspect of QIS5 impact study is that all the participating 
companies recorded equity levels greater than the minimum capital requirement 
(MCR), the excess capital in this case being 52.5% higher than the capital 
excess calculated using Solvency I, which confirms the stability of the 
participanting companies. From the two types of insurance, the most affected 
one by the application of QIS5 exercise is the general insurance business – 
additional solvency requirements have led to a decrease of over 50% more 
capital surplus for half of Romanian companies surveyed. 
The situation was more modest in the QIS4 exercise when, after applying 
the function of calculation, the seven participants achieved MCR values 
between 20.2% and 67.2% of the SCR values. Totaling the results obtained, it 
appears that capital surplus resulting from the calculation made according to 
technical specifications of the QIS 4 increased by 29.3% compared to capital 
surplus resulting from application of the current solvency regime. After 
aggregating all the results of the seven participants the achieved solvency ratio 
fell by a quarter, from 3.02 to 2.23, the most affected being the general 
insurance business, as a result of lower equity. 
 
Table 2  
Impact of Solvency II  on the Romanian insurance market 
Element  Modification compared 
to the present QIS4 
regime 
(%) 
Modification compared 
to the present QIS5 
regime 
(%) 
Assets   -3.7 -9.77 
Technical reserves for life insurance  -50.8 -40.6 
Technical reserves for general insurance  -3.6 -21.7 
Equity +57 +45.82 
Solvency capital requirement  +112 +107.74 
MCR/SCR ratio  41.4 39.34 
Capital surplus  +29.3 +52.2 
Solvency ratio  -26.15 -36.92 
 
As it can be seen, the implementation of Solvency II will have a major 
impact by reducing the technical reserves but mainly by increasing the required 
solvency capital – a difficult requirement to meet by medium-sized insurance 
companies that see the capitalization as a hard to led burden, particularly for the 
general insurance business where the underwriting risk is high. But at the same 
time, solvency capital requirements (SCR) will increase, especially in general 
insurance business where there is a higher underwriting risk. 
 
 
 Laura Elly Naghi 
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Conclusions  
 
Despite all odds, the insurance market expresses its readiness to apply the 
new solvency regime and to obtain the benefits of Solvency II preached – the 
investors who expected the increase in the company value, corporate managers 
who wish a better control of risks, the regulatory authority seeking to improve 
the financial capacity of the market actors, and last but not least the final 
consumer who expects better protection and innovative insurance products. 
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